Kongress von Verona
I. Affaires d’Espagne
Denkschrift Wellingtons (Großbritannien)
Im Auftrag seiner Regierung rät der britische Gesandte Wellington von jeglicher Intervention in Spanien ab und geht nicht weiter auf die in der Denkschrift der französischen Regierung aufgeworfenen Fragen ein.
|Bezeichnung||Denkschrift Wellingtons (Großbritannien)|
|Ort/Datum||Verona, 30. 10. 1822|
|Signatur||Wien, ÖStA, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Kongressakten, Kart. 23, Fasz. 43 (alt), 134–143|
Das Schriftstück liegt in der englischen Originalfassung zweifach auf fol. 134–137 (Lithographie) und fol. 138–143 (handschriftlich) ein. Die Transkription folgt der Fassung auf fol. 134–137. Eine französische Übersetzung von der Hand Gentz liegt auf fol. 133 und 144–146 ein, eine Lithographie der französischen Übersetzung findet sich auf fol. 132 und 147–148. Vermerk mit Bleistift in der rechten oberen Ecke von fol. 132r: „No. 6.“
|Vgl. gedruckte Quelle||BFSP, 1822–1823, S. 6–8;|
|Vgl. gedruckte Quelle||Clarke, Papers presented to parliament 1823, S. 26–30.|
Since the month of April 1820, the British Government have availed themselves of every opportunity of recommending to His Majesty’s Allies to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain.
Without adverting to those principles which His Majesty’s Government must always consider the rule of their conduct in relation to the internal Affairs of other Countries, they considered that to whatever degree either the origin of the Spanish revolution,1 the system then established, or the conduct of those who have since had the management of the internal Affairs of Spain might be disapproved of, any amelioration, which might be desired in the Spanish system, for the sake of Spain Herself, ought to be sought for in measures to be adopted in Spain, rather than abroad, and particularly in the confidence which the people should be taught to feel in the Character and measures of the King.
They considered that an interference with a view to assist the Monarch on the throne, to overturn that which had been settled, and which he had guaranteed, or to promote the establishement[Bl. 134v] of any other form of Government or Constitution, particularly by force, would only place that Monarch in a false position, and prevent him from looking to the internal means of amelioration which might be within His reach.
Such an interference always appeared to the British Government an unnecessary assumption of responsibility which, considering all the circumstances, must expose the King of Spain to danger, and the power or powers which should interfere, to obloquy, certain risks, and possible disasters to enormous expences, and final disappointement in producing any result.
Upon these principles His Majesty has advised His Allies, and has acted Himself, from the month of April 1820, to the present day.
The Protocoles and other Acts of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, which established the union at present existing between the five powers so happily for the world, require the most unlimited confidence and communication on the part of Each; and accordingly His Majesty has never failed to communicate to His Allies, and particularly to France, every instruction which he has sent to His Minister at Madrid, and all the communications made by His Majesty’s commands to the Minister of Spain residing[Bl. 135r] in London; all in the same spirit of good will towards the King of Spain and the Spanish Nation.
It is impossible to look at the existing relations between France and Spain without adverting to what has passed from the commencement of the year 1820 to the present moment, and without being sensible of the unfortunately false position in which the King of Spain is placed, and that the spirit of party in both countries, having aggravated the national antipathy which antecedent circumstances had occasioned, is in a great measure the cause of the unfortunate Irritation in Spain against France, to which his Excellency the Minister of France has adverted.
The great object of His Majesty’s Foreign policy is to preserve peace among Nations, and He feels the most anxious interest for the happiness of His most Christian Majesty 2 and the honour of His Government, and it would be His sincere desire to allay that irritation, but His government cannot but feel that, to make any declaration on any of the three points referred to by His Excellency, without a previous accurate knowledge of all the circumstances which have occured between the[Bl. 135v] two Countries, would be not only premature and unjust, but would probably be unavailing, and would in fact deprive His Majesty of the power of discussing and deciding upon the measures of his own Government in this Affair hereafter, when he should be better informed.
His Majesty must either place Himself in this painful and inconsistent position for an independent Sovereign, or he must do what would be equally painful to His feelings, require from His August Friend and Ally the King of France, that He should submit his conduct to the advice and control of His Majesty.
His Majesty’s Government cannot think either alternative to be necessary, but are of opinion, that a review of the obvious circumstances of the situation of France, as well as of Spain, will shew that, whatever may be the tone assumed towards France by the ruling Powers in Spain, they are not in a state to carry into execution any plan of real hostility or injury.
Considering that a civil war exists in the whole extent of the Frontier which separates the two Kingdoms, that hostile Armies are in movement and in operation on[Bl. 136r] every part of it, and that there is not a town or village on the French frontiers which is not liable to insult and injury, there is no person who must not approve of the precaution which H. M. C. M.His Most Christian Majesty has taken in forming a Corps of observation for the protection of His frontier, and for the preservation [?] of the tranquillity of His people. H. B. MHis British Majesty sincerely wishes that this measure may be effectual in attaining the objects for which it is calculated, and that the wisdom of the French Government will have induced them to explain it at Madrid, in such terms as will satisfy the Government of His Catholic Majesty of its necessity.
Such an explanation will, it is hoped, tend to allay in some degree the irritation against France; and, on the other hand, it may be hoped that some allowance will be made in France for the state of effervescence of Men’s Minds in Spain, in the very Crisis of a revolution and civil war.
A moments reflection upon the relative power of the two States will shew, that the real Evil to which H. M. C. M.His Most Christian Majesty is exposed, is that resulting from the operations of the civil war on the neighbouring Frontier of Spain, against which the measure which His Government have adopted is best calculated to preserve Him. Even revolutionary madness could not calculate[Bl. 136v] upon the success of a serious attack by Spain upon France, under any circumstances which it is possible to suppose to exist at present in the latter kingdom. But the attention of the Spanish Government is now occupied by a civil war, the operations of which certainly justify the formation of a Corps of observation in France; and it is not very probable that they would, at this moment, desire to break with France. Neither is it to be believed that, in their present situation, they would not desire still to enjoy the advantage of that countenance to their system, which the presence of the French Ambassador at the seat of Government must afford them.
His Majesty therefore considers any rupture by Spain, or any measure on her part which may render necessary the immediate discontinuance of diplomatic Relations by France, very improbable, and as His Majesty is quite unacquainted with what has passed between France and Spain since the month of April 1820, and His Government cannot know upon what grounds His Most Christian Majesty’s Government may think proper to discontinue the diplomatic relations of France with Spain, or upon what grounds war may break out between the two countries, it is impossible for them now to pronounce what[Bl. 137r] advice they should consider it their duty to give to His Majesty, in case either or both of those events should occur.
|Zitierempfehlung||Kongress von Verona I. Affaires d’Espagne Denkschrift Wellingtons (Großbritannien). In: Mächtekongresse 1818–1822. Digitale Edition, hrsg. von Karin Schneider unter Mitarbeit von Stephan Kurz, Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Institut für Neuzeit- und Zeitgeschichtsforschung 2018. URL: https://maechtekongresse.acdh.oeaw.ac.at/pages/show.html?document=Verona_I_6.xml&directory=editions, abgerufen 27.06.2022, 21:10.|